











Reforms to the EI program should focus on removing barriers to 
mobility by creating uniform, nationwide entrance requirements and 
benefit entitlement periods.
NO. 144, NOVEMBER 2011
SOCIAL POLICYUnder the current Employment Insurance (EI) system, long-lasting EI benefits are more
easily accessed in regions with high unemployment rates than in regions with low
unemployment rates where workers face tighter restrictions to access short-lived benefits.
This complicated screening procedure, intended to better support the various circumstances
facing unemployed workers across the country, creates a number of undesirable consequences:
the most glaring being pockets of high, chronic unemployment.
This Backgrounder argues that Canada’s EI program, instead of providing clear and
equitable access to benefits for all Canadian workers, supports the preservation of regional
labour markets that are dominated by part-year employment. To the extent that variable
entrance requirements support persistently high unemployment rates in a few Canadian
regions, the program hinders the convergence of wages, prices and unemployment rates
across the country. 
The goals and intentions of the EI regime should be simplified to better address the needs
of Canada’s unemployed workers. Reforms are needed to better align the incentives of the
EI program with the national interests of a more dynamic, flexible and buoyant labour
market. Regionally based criteria for determining eligibility and the length of the benefit
period should be replaced by uniform, countrywide EI entrance requirements and benefit
entitlement periods. An improved screening mechanism would allow EI parameters to be
tightened as the economy recovers and loosened when it enters a downturn.
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T
he strikingly rapid job losses
during the 2008/2009 recession
have focused Canadians’
attention on the geographic differences
that determine Employment Insurance
(EI) access and generosity. 
Under the current system, EI benefits are more
easily accessed for longer periods in regions with
high unemployment rates than in regions with
low unemployment rates, where the maximum
entitlement period is much shorter. As a result of
the recession, there has been widespread concern
that the eligibility and entitlement parameters of
the system were not adjusting appropriately for
workers situated in hard-hit, urban regions such as
auto-manufacturing centres Windsor and Oshawa,
which traditionally have been treated as low-
entitlement regions. 
Neither workers in high-unemployment, high-
entitlement nor low-unemployment, low-
entitlement regions benefit in the long run from
the system’s current design. In high-unemployment
regions, the program creates long-term EI
dependence that results in concentrated pockets of
persistent unemployment, trapping workers in
patterns of seasonal labour. Full-time, full-year
workers located in regions with lower unemployment
rates are the primary funding source for this
pattern of part-year work in high-unemployment
regions (May and Hollett 1995). 
The EI program, therefore, undermines the
economic benefits that stem from labour mobility
in pursuit of higher wages and more attractive
work, the re-allocation of workers among sectors
and geographical regions, and a regional
convergence in wages, prices, and unemployment
rates.
1 Reforms to the EI program should focus on
removing barriers to mobility by creating uniform,
nationwide EI entrance requirements and benefit
entitlement periods.
Public policy aimed at sustaining rural economies
plagued by seasonal unemployment is executed in
part through the system of narrowly defined,
regional variations in EI provisions and regulations.
Variable entrance requirements (VER) stipulate
that individuals in a low-unemployment-rate
region (less than six percent) are required to have
700 or more insurable hours of employment in
the preceding 52 weeks in order to qualify for
benefits, whereas a worker in a very high-unemployment-
rate region (more than 13 percent) requires only
420 hours in the same qualifying period.
2
Reinforcing this division among the unemployed
is the fact that the latter group is also entitled to
longer maximum benefit periods. 
Public officials’ response to the range of entry
requirements is to emphasize that requirements
loosen when local unemployment rates increase
and tighten when they fall. Thus, they maintain,
the system’s eligibility criteria respond flexibly to
local economic conditions. While the merits of
this defence are arguable at best,
3 VERs impose
real restrictions to accessing EI. In fact, laid-off
workers in low-unemployment regions have
greater difficulty in qualifying for EI than
otherwise similar individuals in high-unemployment
regions.
4 This geography-based policy contributes
The authors would like to thank Ben Dachis, Andrew Jackson, Jon Medow, Alice Nakamura, Craig Riddell and the C.D. Howe Institute
research team for comments on prior versions of this paper. The authors assume all responsibility for the paper's errors and opinions.
1 Labour economists are virtually unanimous in their view that regional labour mobility is a hallmark of an efficient labour market. Nonetheless, the
topic of labour migration is notoriously difficult to analyze empirically, and empirical evidence regarding the precise link between EI and
labour mobility is mixed (Audas and McDonald 2003).
2 See http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/sc/ei/benefits/regular.shtml for the current rules on EI access and duration. 
3 Indeed, the local unemployment rate is a poor indicator for the ability of a worker to obtain employment in a given geographic region, in
part because it reflects the stock of unemployed workers relative to the stock of the labour force and takes no account of flows into or out of
unemployment (i.e., it is a snapshot measure). By contrast, the rate of employment growth is a superior measure of the probability that an
unemployed worker will find a job, as it captures the dynamic state of the local labour market. 
4 In his extensive review paper on the unemployment insurance programs of all other OECD countries, Radmilovic (2011, 7) concludes that,
“It is only in Canada that regional differentiation forms an integral part of the EI regime.” C.D. Howe Institute
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to incentives against mobility, thereby reinforcing
patterns of persistently high unemployment and
dependency among groups of seasonal workers
who, by definition, are inactive for much of the
year. As a result, should there be an increased
global demand for commodities, for example,
labour shortages are more likely to occur in
Western Canada.
Regional EI Coverage – Under-coverage in
Some Regions Affected by VER 
The recent recession led to public concerns that
too few laid-off workers – particularly those in
low-unemployment regions facing relatively
stringent entrance requirements – are eligible for
EI benefits. Across Canada, the range of EI
participation is wide and, not surprisingly, varies
substantially according to the strictness of the
entrance requirements determined by the regional
unemployment rate (Figure 1).
5,6 For instance,
based on 2008 employment records, 57.3 percent
of job losers in Ottawa would qualify for benefits,
whereas 93.5 percent in Restigouche/Albert, N.B.
would qualify. Regions in the Atlantic Provinces
tend to have a higher percentage of individuals
that meet the VER, particularly in rural regions,
whereas the opposite applies in many of the
region’s urbanized areas.
7
A simple statistical analysis takes the data from
regional employment rates and the observed level
of access to EI benefits to determine the likelihood
of accessing – or the predicted ability to access –
EI given one’s geographic location. The fitted
curved line through the observations in Figure 1
represents the predicted value for access. According
to the program’s design and stated objective – to
modulate EI access conditions in response to local
labour market conditions – one would expect to
obtain a positive relationship, or correlation,
between the local unemployment and EI coverage
rates. And this is, indeed, largely the case.
However, an unanticipated statistical result is
that the local unemployment rate variable explains
only 43 percent of the fluctuations in the EI
coverage rate across regions and, therefore, other
unspecified (and currently unknown) factors
generate 57 percent of those variations. In other
words, more than half the degree of coverage is
being generated by influences other than the one
on which the government relies to assess the
neediness of unemployed workers. The graphical
interpretation is that the fit of the curve through
the data points does not appear to be that tight,
suggesting that variable entrance requirements are
only partially fulfilling the intended function.
8
This finding suggests that the local unemployment
rate is a blunt indicator for measuring local labour
market conditions. 
5 The measure of regional EI coverage that we employ in this piece is the ratio of the number of laid-off workers who met the qualification
requirements to the total number of job losses that have occurred as the result of involuntary layoffs (reported over the previous 52 weeks).
We eschew the oft-cited measure of the beneficiaries to unemployment ratio (B/U) used often by labour market commentators (see
Mendelsohn and Medow 2010), which tends to underestimate the true degree of EI coverage (Gray and Sweetman 2004, Bishop and
Burleton 2009). Our data are grouped at the relatively low level of the EI administrative region as opposed to the level of the province. The
advantage of exploiting regional rather than provincial data is that provinces are characterized by diverse labour market conditions within
them. By contrast, the EI administrative regions are purposefully formed in order to group geographical areas with relatively similar labour
market conditions, as measured by local unemployment rates. 
6 Documentation and a brief presentation appear on pages 74-75 of the EI Monitoring and Assessment Report 2009. The source for our data is
Table 8.
7 Importantly, the rates of coverage in low-unemployment regions, though generally lower than those in high-unemployment regions, are not
as low as the B/U ratio suggests. 
8 According to a simple econometric analysis based on fitting a log-linear regression line through the points in Figure 1, for every one
percentage point decrease of a region’s unemployment rate, EI access conditions tighten, and the qualification ratio in the case of a layoff
declines by 1.7 percent. The simple regression equation has a 0.43 determination coefficient, implying that a region’s unemployment rate
explains only 43 percent of the variation in effective EI coverage – a somewhat loose statistical relationship. On a graphical level, this loose fit
is represented by the dispersion of the points away from the line, reflecting the intended relationship between these two variables. Essential Policy Intelligence C.D. Howe Institute 
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When one compares the evolution of these
values for effective coverage over time within a
given economic region – as opposed to variations
between regions, as in the analysis above – there is
also a positive relationship between the coverage
rate and the local unemployment rate.
9 This
positive relationship is consistent with program
design – as labour market conditions deteriorate
(improve) over time within a given region, access
is loosened (tightened). 
In addition to raising equity issues, these
differences in eligibility criteria also lead to more
troubling long-term labour market problems,
particularly the way in which regional eligibility
and benefit entitlement variations increase
economic barriers to geographical mobility. As the
VER feature is based in large part on differences
in structural unemployment – longer-term
unemployment caused by a mismatch in worker
skills – as opposed to cyclical unemployment
caused by the ebbs and flows in the economy, the
VER tends to reinforce economic rigidities. In this
way, it contributes to persistent unemployment in
high-entitlement regions by reducing incentives to
adjust to adverse labour market conditions
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Hard to Qualify Easy to Qualify
Figure 1: Percent of Laid-off Workers who Qualify for EI, 2005 and 2008 
Source: Authors’ calculations from HRSDC (2009).
Note: Data points represent the proportion of involuntarily laid-off workers in each region who qualify for EI according to the last 
52 weeks on their records of employment paired with the unemployment rate in the EI administrative region. 
9 This analysis is not shown in the figures. C.D. Howe Institute
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The Ongoing Dispersion in Canada’s
Unemployment Rates
In an efficient, flexible labour market where
economic conditions in one region are stronger
than those in another, some workers in the worse-
off region would migrate to the better-off region
where the prospects for employment are brighter.
This process would continue until the degree of
opportunity for employment in each region was
roughly the same. In other words, a sort of
arbitrage process would occur that would at least
reduce, but certainly not eliminate, the imbalance.  
We have carried out a crude, empirical analysis
in search of evidence that such an adjustment
pattern is occurring. We measure the variation
among regional unemployment rates in relation to
the national average – the dispersion of
unemployment – and we relate it to the
unemployment rate for all of Canada. In flexible
labour markets characterized by few barriers to
mobility and other frictions, irrespective of the
trend in global labour market conditions, one
would expect that degree of variation to diminish
over time, reflecting a trend toward partial
convergence among regional unemployment rates.
Given a climate of overall employment growth
and a declining national unemployment rate, this
adjustment phenomenon would be associated
with a positive relationship between these two
variables – if workers are in short supply in one
region and abundant in another, the regional
variation in unemployment should fall with the
national unemployment rate as workers move to
where jobs are abundant. 
Canada’s recent labour market history, however,
shows that the opposite is true: as the national
labour market improves and the aggregate
unemployment rate falls, the degree of
unemployment dispersion tends to rise (Figure 2).
10
This suggests that there is a range of factors
working to hinder convergence – including both
economic and non-economic influences – that
conspire to inhibit the mobility of workers from
one region to another.
11
What is the Source of “Sticky, ” High Dispersion
for the Regional Unemployment Rates? 
As mentioned above, the dispersion among
regional unemployment rates has continued, even
in the backdrop of a sustained, long-standing
trend of improving aggregate unemployment. The
rising tide has not lifted all boats. In Canada,
regional unemployment tends to be persistent,
especially for a few historically high-unemployment
regions. The scatter plot shown in Figure 3 relates
the 1987 unemployment rate in each labour-
force-survey region (on the horizontal axis) to its
value in 2010 (on the vertical axis). A weak
relationship between historical unemployment
rates and today’s unemployment rates would
imply a low degree of correlation, in which case
one would expect the statistically-predicted
average to be represented by a straight, horizontal
line, indicating little persistence. Under this
scenario, the unemployment rate in 1987 would be
a poor predictor of the rate in 2010. In contrast, a
predicted average represented by a positively
10 A simple, linear regression analysis based on monthly data between 1987 and 2010 was estimated from an equation having as its dependent
variable the coefficient of variation of the unemployment rates among the economic regions, and the national unemployment rate as the
independent variable. The estimated coefficient is negative and statistically significant, but the fit of the estimated coefficient is not
overwhelming. Much of the observed increase in the coefficient of variation over this interval is driven by the declining mean level of
unemployment, which goes in the denominator as some astute reviewers pointed out. This implies that the unemployment rates in many
regions have fallen by a lower proportion than was the case for the national rate of unemployment.
11 We note that many other developed economies also have market disparities in regional unemployment rates. An OECD (2000) study
concludes that they rose during the 1980s in a majority of OECD countries. The study attributes this phenomenon to a variety of
institutional as well as economic factors such as accessibility (or lack thereof) to product and/or factor markets, unmeasured characteristics of
labour supply, the extent of innovative activity, the industrial composition, the lack of opportunities to exploit economies of scale in local
production, wage determination mechanisms and unemployment insurance provisions. The study authors recommend policies that aim to
reduce the inequality of the distribution of unemployment between regions as a means to improve overall national performance. Essential Policy Intelligence C.D. Howe Institute 
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sloped line through the points would indicate a
fairly high degree of persistence. In other words, a
relatively high- (low-) 1987 unemployment rate in
a particular region tends correlate with a high-
(low-) one 23 years later. The regions with
relatively high unemployment rates tend to have
persistently high unemployment and vice versa. 
Figure 3 uses two lines to show the contrast
between the regions with relatively low-unemployment
rates on the left with the relatively high rates on
the right. While there is some modest persistence
in unemployment rates in most of Canada’s
economic regions, measured by a fairly flat line for
low unemployment regions, the persistence in
high-unemployment regions is much stronger,
which drives much of the dispersion in unemployment
rates.
12This reflects the phenomenon of chronically
unemployed workers, primarily seasonal ones, in
these high-unemployment regions making up a
disproportionate share of the unemployed, both in
their regions and nationally (Brooks 2005). One
reason, therefore, for the phenomenon of rising





















































































Source: CANSIM Table No. 282-0054; authors’ calculations.
Note: The method for calculating dispersion is simply the coefficient of variation – the standard deviation of all data points divided by the
mean. The data were deseasonalized according to the US Census Bureau’s X-12 technique. 
Figure 2: Unemployment Dispersion Rates, 1987-2011dispersion rates among the regions is that there is
a growing level of unemployment inequality
concentrated among a subset of the high-
unemployment rate regions in Canada.
Another empirical measure that bears out this
point is derived from splitting Canada’s economic
regions into high-unemployment and low-
unemployment groups. Applying the widely-used
Theil statistic in Figure 4 to measure inter-
regional disparities in unemployment rates, we
commence by dividing the regions into those two
broad groups according to their unemployment
rates in 1987.
13 The question is whether the
widening degree of dispersion is due primarily to
a) the unemployment rates of individual regions
within a group becoming less similar over time, or
b) the overall gap between the two broad groups
widening over time. 
The mostly rising solid line in Figure 4 shows
that disparities in unemployment rates have been
growing over time within high-unemployment-
rate regions while remaining at roughly the same
level for low-unemployment-rate regions. This
implies that despite the fact that many formerly
C.D. Howe Institute
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Source: CANSIM Table No. 282-0054; authors’ calculations.
Figure 3: Persistence in Regional Unemployment Rates, 1987 vs. 2010
13 To compute Theil’s statistic for low- (and high-) unemployment regions, we multiply a low- (high-) unemployment region’s annual labour
force share within all low- (high-) unemployment regions by the ratio of a region’s unemployment rate to the average for all low- (high-)
unemployment rates and by the natural logarithm of the unemployment rate ratio, and then sum these products for each year. Essential Policy Intelligence C.D. Howe Institute 
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high-unemployment-rate regions have seen their
rates drop since 1987, a somewhat small, yet
consequential group of economic regions have
seen persistently high unemployment over this
period, and have thus fallen even further behind
the rest of Canada. This phenomenon occurs
mainly in rural regions with a high concentration
of seasonal workers – the most common repeat
users of EI. 
This preliminary empirical investigation does
not imply that the EI regime is the sole causal
factor of labour market rigidity. Given the current
state of data availability, few researchers have been
able to rely on solid, rigorous techniques to link
labour mobility with the workings of an EI
regime.
14 We do suggest, however, that the level of
unemployment prevailing in high-entitlement
areas has remained persistently high in the context
of a 10-year-plus recovery in the aggregate labour
market in Canada, and that the EI program
incentives work against labour mobility rather



















































































Figure 4: Concentration of High-unemployment Regions, 1987 to 2010
Source: CANSIM Table No. 282-0054; authors’ calculations.
14 One exception of which we are aware is authored by Kuhn and Riddell (2010), who demonstrate that the long-term impact of the EI regime
in New Brunswick has been to drastically alter the composition of employment toward more part-year jobs. C.D. Howe Institute
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Recommendations and Conclusions 
The goals and intentions of the EI regime should
be simplified to better address the needs of Canada’s
unemployed workers. The inherent complexities
in determining EI eligibility according to local
unemployment rates drive a geographic wedge
between otherwise similar Canadian workers who
live in different parts of the country. While variable
EI qualification requirements are intended to
deliver generous benefits to seasonal workers,
these benefits are extended to all workers in the
region, regardless of the type of job for which they
are searching. 
For instance, unemployed workers who are
waiting for the beginning of the next seasonal
working cycle are treated in exactly the same way
as permanent laid-off workers who are seeking
long-term, stable employment in another field.
The current geographically driven access-and-
benefit period lengths cater to short-term regional
concerns and, therefore, contribute panelled
construction to long-term EI dependency for many
workers. Pockets of high, chronic unemployment
contribute to perpetually depressed local labour
markets and to long unemployment spells,
whereas a more flexible labour force would
respond better to competitive market pressures
and attenuate differences in regional incomes and
employment conditions. Reforms are needed to
better align the incentives of the EI program with
the national interests of a more dynamic, flexible
and buoyant labour market. 
Regionally based criteria for determining
eligibility and the length of the benefit period
should be replaced by uniform, countrywide, EI
entrance requirements and benefit entitlement
periods. This would probably entail shorter
qualification periods in some low-unemployment
regions, but the uniform entry requirement
should not be set at the lowest current level of 420
hours, as that would facilitate the development of
part-year, frequent use of EI benefits in (relatively)
low-unemployment areas.
15
Modulating the program’s parameters to the
regional unemployment rate has contributed to
both inequities and inefficiencies, and siphoned
funds away from other pressing needs of unemployed
workers, such as retraining laid-off workers. In
this particular policy context, both efficiency and
equity can be enhanced simultaneously through
program reform. New benefit criteria should be
linked to the national unemployment rate, or
better yet, the rate of growth or decline in
national employment.
16 Such a mechanism would
allow the program’s parameters and requirements
to be tightened as the economy recovers and
loosened when it enters a downturn. Using a
growth-of-employment measure would better
capture the local labour market’s degree of fluidity,
which is more closely associated with the
probability of finding a job.
Essential for a well-functioning national labour
market are policies that facilitate and, at a
minimum, do not deter labour market mobility.
In contrast, the current EI program acts more as a
provincial and sub-provincial level program
through the geographic variance in access and
benefits. Hence, another good reason for eliminating
the VER and variable benefit durations is because
they work against the purposes of a national
program, with unintended consequences including
persistent pockets of high unemployment. The bulk
of the Canadian labour market, through its EI
15 Even if the entry requirements were lowered from the current maximum level of 20 weeks (700 hours) to an intermediate level such as 16
weeks (560 hours), many of those who are currently ineligible would still not gain access, as this group tends to exhibit very low work levels
during the qualifying period. 
16 An insightful reviewer raised the question that if the regional unemployment rate is a poor determinant for the appropriate EI system
parameters, why would the national unemployment rate be superior in this role? One response we have argued is that the eligibility
parameters should not be modulated according to the structural rate of unemployment. A large component of local unemployment rates in
high-unemployment regions is structural in nature, while this applies to only a fairly small component of the national rate. Bishop and
Burleton (2009) also discuss the benefits of alternative measures that better capture job opportunities.Essential Policy Intelligence C.D. Howe Institute 
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contributions, redistributes income toward
seasonal economies and industries. Variable
entrance requirements are the complex, rather
opaque screen by which this redistribution takes
place (Corak and Chen 2005). As a consequence,
the EI program leads to undercoverage for some
workers in certain areas of the country, weakening
EI’s effectiveness as a social safety net.
17
Furthermore, the EI program should not
support the preservation of rural labour markets
that are dominated by part-year employment. To
the extent that VERs support persistently high-
unemployment rates in a few Canadian regions,
the program hinders the convergence of wages,
prices and unemployment rates across the country. 
Reforms to the EI program should remove
incentives that deter workers moving from a high-
to a low-unemployment region, thus keeping the
financial costs of moving as low as possible. As the
Canadian economy recovers from the current
recession and western Canadian businesses create
jobs at pre-recession levels, the need for worker
mobility will be of critical importance. 
17 Another, somewhat related policy measure that would reduce the subsidy for seasonal employment patterns would be to restore the “intensity
rule” for younger workers (who are presumably more mobile) in order to discourage repeat, seasonal dependence on the EI regime – a
provision originally implemented in 1997 and repealed in 2000. Such a rule would reduce the weekly benefit amount of workers based on
the number of weeks of regular benefits that the claimant has received over the past few years. This would not affect the qualification rules 
for EI, but apply only to those who do qualify. For a compelling history of the development of these rules in Canada, see Nakamura and
Diewert (2000).C.D. Howe Institute
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